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ABSTRACT  
 
In a society where data is the lifeblood, data privacy will inevitably play 
a central role. In this article, I will examine in some detail the concept 
of data privacy law and how it applies to Internet conduct. This is a 
dauntingly large topic and as a consequence, the selection of issues 
discussed has had to be somewhat eclectic  
RESUMEN  
 
En una sociedad donde los datos son el alma, la privacidad de  
los datos inevitablemente desempeñará un papel central. En este  
artículo, se examinará en detalle el concepto de ley de privacidad  
de datos y cómo se aplica a la conducta de Internet. Este es un 
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tema grande con grandes desafíos y como consecuencia de ello, la 
selección de temas ha tenido que ser algo ecléctica.  
KEY WORDS  
Personal information - privacy - legality - Internet - globalization - 
interaction humanizes  
PALABRAS CLAVES  
Datos personales - privacidad - legalidad - internet - globalización  
- interacción humana  
INTRODUCTION  
It seems impossible these days to pick up any Internet-focused law  
journal without finding at least some articles dealing with some  
data privacy-related topic - data privacy is very much the flavour of  
the month. That this is so is not surprising. As noted by Rotenberg  
already in 1996: ‘Privacy will be to the information economy of the  
next century what consumer protection and environmental concerns  
have been to the industrial society of the 20th century.’1  
In a society where data is the lifeblood, data privacy will inevitably play a 
central role. In this article, I will examine in some detail the concept of 
data privacy law and how it applies to Internet conduct. This is a 
dauntingly large topic and as a consequence, the selection of issues 
discussed has had to be somewhat eclectic. For example, the majority of 
examples included in the discussion below are drawn from Europe, the US 
and Australia.  
DATA PRIVACY LAW - WHAT’S THE BIG DEAL?  
The concept of data privacy is elusive indeed and attempts at a  
clear definition generally seem to have failed. Thus, it is no surprise  
that the concept of data privacy law also is difficult to define with  
clarity, and delineate with precision. Adding further to the problem  
is the fact that many key concepts commonly included, expressly or  
implicitly, in attempts at defining data privacy law are themselves  
hard to pin down. For example, data privacy laws could be seen  
to essentially involve the protection of ‘personal data’ or ‘personal  
information’. However, as has been illustrated e.g. by Burdon and  
Telford, the concept of personal data/information is, itself, lacking  
a clear definition.2  
 
 
1 James Gleick, ‘Big Brother Is Us’, The New York Times, 29 September 1996 <http://www.nytimes.  
com/1996/09/29/magazine/ big-brother-is-us.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>.  
2 Mark Burdon and Paul Telford, The conceptual basis of personal information in Australian privacy law, eLaw 
Journal: Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law (2010) 17(1). 
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A further cause of some confusion is the geographical differences  
in terminology. Addressing this issue, Bygrave notes that: “In  
Europe, such law [what I here refer to as data privacy law] tends to  
be described as ‘data protection law’. In North America, Australia,  
and New Zealand, the preferred nomenclature tends to be ‘privacy  
law’.”3 The full extent of the confusion this causes only becomes  
clear when we consider the fact that, Europeans give a specific  
meaning to ‘privacy law’, different to ‘data protection law’:  
 
“In some respects, data privacy [or data protection] canvasses more  
than what are typically regarded as privacy concerns. The rules  
aimed at ensuring adequate data quality are an example in point. In  
other respects, data privacy encompasses less than privacy per se.  
The latter has spatial, bodily, and perhaps psychological dimensions  
that are usually not directly addressed by data privacy law.4 (internal  
footnote omitted)”  
 
At any rate, as long as we remain vigilant to their unavoidable  
deficiencies, several useful articulations of data privacy law are  
worth noting. Put very simply, privacy could be said to mean  
the “right to be let alone”.5 Another possible definition is that  
privacy is “[t]he interest of a person in sheltering his or her life  
from unwanted interference or public scrutiny.”6 An even more  
sophisticated definition would be to say that privacy relates to “[m]  
aterial that so closely pertains to a person to his[/her] innermost  
thoughts, actions and relationships that he[/she] may legitimately  
claim the prerogative of deciding whether, with whom and under  
what circumstances he[she] will share it.”7 Looked at in terms of  
functionality, the following definition is useful: “Data privacy law  
specifically regulates all or most stages in the processing of certain  
kinds of data. It accordingly addresses the ways in which data is  
gathered, registered, stored, exploited, and disseminated.”8  
 
Perhaps neither of these definition could be said to be more correct  
than the others, but taken together they provide a rather clear picture  
of what we mean when we talk about data privacy and data privacy  
law. While acknowledging the extensive literature9 that exists on  
 
 
3 Lee A. Bygrave, Data privacy law: An international perspective (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014),  
at xxv.  
4 Lee A. Bygrave, Data privacy law: An international perspective (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014),  
at 3.  
5 S. Warren and L. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harvard Law Review 193 (1890).  
6 P. Nygh and P. Butt, Butterworths Concise Australian Legal Dictionary (2nd edn, Sydney, 
Butterworths, 1998)  
7 Australian Law Reform Commission, Unfair Publication: Defamation and Privacy, Report No. 11 
(1979), at 110.  
8 Lee A. Bygrave, Data privacy law: An international perspective (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014), at 1.  
9 Consider e.g. R C Post, Three concepts of privacy, 89(6) Georgetown Law Journal 2087 (2001). 
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this topic and the numerous variations of the definitions above it  
provides, I will not here delve deeper into the question of definition.  
One important aspect to keep in mind, however, is that privacy is an  
internationally recognised fundamental human right.10 Nevertheless,  
our personal information is increasingly treated, both by ourselves  
and by others, as a commercial commodity in our information  
society. In light of this, and bearing in mind the increase in the  
number of data privacy laws, it is more than likely that the area  
of data privacy law will continue to develop as one of the most  
significant and urgent Internet law questions over the coming years.  
This development is caused by several factors such as:  
a.- the globalisation of human interaction;  
b.- the increasing commercial emphasis on data (companies such as  
 Google and Facebook are built entirely on the data they hold); c.- the 
increasing governmental interest in data;  
d.- the increase in voluntary data sharing such as people posting,  
 or otherwise distributing, their personal information on social  
 networking sites;  
e.- the  mentioned  increasing  ‘commodification’  of  personal  
information (for example, many online services are provided for ‘free’ 
due to the data users provide - personal information is the currency 
used to pay for those services); and  
f.- the increasing emphasis on privacy as a human right, protected  
 under, for example, the ICCPR (Article 17) and its inevitable clash  
 with partly competing human rights such as freedom of speech.  
 
To this we may add the complications stemming from the fact that 
we have entered an era of so-called cloud computing11 where the 
geographical location of data may not be clear, or as one 
commentator puts it “an era of cloud computing which disregards 
physical borders.”12 However, the impact of cloud computing should not be 
overstated. As noted by Kuan and Millard:  
 
“While the popular view seems to be that in cloud computing data  
moves around the world continuously and almost randomly, so that  
it’s not possible to know where a specific user’s data are located  
at any one time [...], in practice this is often not so. In most cases,  
 
 
10 See, eg, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp No 
16, UN Doc A/6316/1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976), art 17 (‘ICCPR’) and the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 
November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953), as amended by Protocols No 11 and 
No 14 (Rome, 4.XI.1950) (‘ECHR’).  
11 For a discussion of privacy issues arising in the setting of cloud computing, see, eg, Dan Svantesson and 
Roger Clarke, ‘Privacy and Consumer Risks in Cloud Computing’ (July 2010) 26(4) Computer Law and 
Security Review 391-7.  
12 Clare Sullivan, Protecting digital identity in the cloud: Regulating cross border data disclosure (2014) 
30(2) Computer Law and Security Review 137-152, at 152. 
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data are usually copied or replicated to different data centres, for  
business continuity/backup purposes, rather than being ‘moved’ by  
being deleted from one data centre and re-created in another. Also,  
the primary copy of a set of related data [...] will often be stored in  
the same data centre. This will typically be the one geographically  
closest to the user in question, for latency reasons (speed of access  
and response for users), albeit perhaps data may be stored in  
fragments distributed amongst different storage hardware within  
that data centre. Often the provider will know where a user’s data  
fragments (eg for a particular application) are stored, at the data  
centre if not equipment level. However, in most cases, whether for  
security or other reasons, providers do not disclose to users their  
data’s location.13”  
Furthermore, in seeking to predict the future relevance of data  
privacy law in the Internet context, it is interesting to contrast it  
to its arguably most closely related field of law, that is, defamation  
law. Internet defamation law has gained a considerable amount of  
attention. However, few online businesses publish content that is  
potentially defamatory, and few of us are defamed online to such a  
degree that we are seriously contemplating embarking on expensive  
cross-border defamation litigation. In contrast, most if not all  
Internet businesses deal with personal information in one way or  
another and thereby risk being exposed to the data privacy laws of  
the countries from which their customers come, and most Internet  
users’ personal information is collected, used and disclosed in one  
form or another through their everyday Internet use. This adds  
further to my inclination to suspect that the area of data privacy law  
will maintain its centre stage position in the coming years.  
Despite all this, one frequently sees suggestions that privacy is a  
thing of the past. For example, already in 1999, the Chairman and  
former CEO of Sun Microsystems Scott McNealy stated: ‘You  
have zero privacy anyhow. Get over it.’14 In a similar vein, former  
Google CEO Eric Schmidt stated: ‘If you have something that you  
don’t want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn’t be doing it in  
the first place’;15 and worse still, Facebook’s Chief Executive Mark  
Zuckerberg has declared the age of privacy to be over.16 Without  
making excuses for such statements, one must remember that they  
are made by people whose entire business depends on downplaying  
data privacy. In other words, their obvious motives should be  
 
13 W Kuan Hon and Christopher Millard, ‘Data Export in Cloud Computing - How Can Personal Data Be  
Transferred Outside the EEA? The Cloud of Unknowing, Part 4’ (2012) 9:1(25) SCRIPT-ed 8 [Queen Mary  
School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 85/2011] <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1925066>.  
14 John Schwartz, ‘As Big PC Brother Watches, Users Encounter Frustration’, New York Times, 5 
September 2001, C6.  
15 Ryan Tate, ‘Google CEO: Secrets Are for Filthy People’ (4 December 2009) Gawker <http://gawker.  
com/5419271/google-ceo-secrets-are-for-filthy-people>. For a strong rebuttal of such claims, see: Dan- 
iel J Solove, ‘“I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy’ (2007) 44 San Diego  
Law Review 745. 
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enough for people to recognise the self-interested nature of these 
statements.  
 
In contrast, it is difficult to find any mitigating circumstances for  
academics taking such a line. Yet, some academics, perhaps in a  
search for the type of attention that controversy commonly brings,  
have opted to attack privacy as a major problem for society: ‘The  
right to privacy is the adult equivalent of Santa Claus and unicorns.  
No one has yet been able to identify where the right to privacy comes  
from and why we need it. In fact, the right to privacy is destructive  
of our wellbeing.’17 Indeed, the same academic commentator has  
suggested: ‘Rather than highlighting the need for more privacy,  
modern technology, in fact, underlines its irrelevance: people are  
more likely to invite attention, than seek anonymity.’18  
 
This type of misrepresentations have been current for some time; and,  
notwithstanding that what they propose is contrary to the evidence  
of facts, they have been met with some credence, particularly  
amongst those with a political agenda hostile to privacy. In the end,  
however, such suggestions lack foundation and are easily refuted,  
both by reference to empirical evidence of how people actually feel  
about privacy and by reference to logical reasoning.  
 
Statistical evidence produced by Eurobarometer in 2011 shows that  
a majority of Europeans are concerned about the recording of their  
behaviour via payment cards, mobile phones and mobile Internet and  
that 70% of Europeans are concerned that their personal data held by  
companies may be used for a purpose other than that for which it was  
collected.19 Further, it is clear that people in general feel a loss of control  
over their privacy with just over a quarter of social network users and  
less than one in five online shoppers feeling in complete control20  
This results in a low level of trust:  ‘Less than one-third trust  
phone companies, mobile phone companies and Internet service  
providers (32%); and just over one-fifth trust Internet companies  
such as search engines, social networking sites and e-mail services  
(22%).’21 In fact, this distrust is so deeply rooted that 62% of the  
 
16  Bruce  Schneier,  Google  and  Facebook’s  Privacy  Illusion (4  June 2010)  Forbes.com  <http:// 
www.forbes.com/2010/04/05/google-facebook-twitter-technology-security-10-privacy. 
html?boxes=Homepagechannels>. 
17 Mirko Bagaric, ‘Privacy Is the Last Thing We Need’, The Age (online), (22 April 2007) <http://www.  
theage.com.au/news/ opinion/privacy-is-the-last-thing-we-need/2007/04/21/1176697146936.html>.  
18 Mirko Bagaric, ‘Rights Must Yield to Community Prosperity : The Fallacy That Is a Strong Right to 
Privacy’ in Brett Mason and Daniel Wood (eds), Future Proofing Australia : The Right Answers for Our 
Future (Melbourne University Press, 2013) 65-80.  
19 European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 359, Attitudes on Data Protection and Electronic 
Identity  in  the  European  Union (June 2011) <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ 
ebs_359_en.pdf> 1-3. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid 2.  
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Europeans taking part in the survey give the minimum required 
information and 75% of them want to delete personal information on a 
website whenever they decide to do so.22 Similar results can be found in 
studies carried out around the world and are not specific to Europe or 
even to western culture. For example, a Japanese study highlighted that 
about 70% of social networking users are worried about privacy 
protection on the Internet.23  
 
Furthermore,  contrary  to  popular  belief,  it  is  not  conclusively  
established that ‘young people’ do not care about privacy.24 First of  
all, the figures above include the views of young people. Second, on  
those occasions adults actually bother to enter into a dialogue with  
them rather than presuming to know what young people think, privacy  
concerns are often expressed by young people. For example, at the  
Nordic Youth Internet Governance Forum held in Stockholm in June  
2012, privacy was highlighted as one of the key concerns by the group  
of young persons present.25 Finally, while admittedly an unscientific  
method to prove the point, those who take the view that young people  
do not care about privacy should perhaps consider how willingly their  
teenage children would give them access to their e-mail accounts,  
Facebook account or indeed, old fashion diaries - if young people  
have no concerns about privacy, they would have no problem willingly  
handing over such information to their parents, but I suspect that such  
voluntary abandonment of privacy would be rare indeed.  
 
Apart from statistical evidence, the erroneous arguments about the  
death, and indeed evils, of privacy such as those presented above  
may be refuted by the following. To say that we do not need a right  
of privacy because our modern information society does not cater  
for privacy is akin to saying that we do not need a right to water in a  
desert - the removal of a fundamental right is justified by reference  
to the environment being hostile to, or making difficult the exercise  
of, such a right. Such reasoning is clearly flawed and does not appear  
generally accepted in any context. Indeed, the opposite is true. For  
example, no reasonable person would suggest that we should not  
seek to protect animals facing extinction by reference to the fact  
that protecting such animals is made difficult by the circumstances  
under which those animals live.  
 
22 Ibid 1-3.  
23 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (Japan), White Paper on Information and Commu- 
nications in Japan 2010 <http://www.soumu.go.jp/johotsusintokei/whitepaper/eng/WP2010/2010- 
index.html>.  
24 See, eg, Angelka Adrian, ‘How Much Privacy Do Clouds Provide? An Australian Perspective’ (2013) 29 
Computer Law and Security Review 48, 56 stating, ‘Younger generations have much less concern about 
online privacy than older generations.’  
25 ‘The Nordic Youth IGF conference (NYIGF) was a pre conference to EuroDIG. Thirty youths in the  
age group of 14 - 17 years from Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Finland and Sweden formed the Nordic  
Youth Delegation. The NYIGF youth conference resulted in a number of recommendations regarding  
Internet governance’: European Dialogue on Internet Governance Secretariat (EuroDIG), Messages from  
Stockholm (14-15 June 2012) <http://www.guarder.net/eurodig/2012/EuroDIG%20 2012_short_mes- 
sages_to%20the%20IGF_final.pdf>. 
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In light of this, privacy - the ‘ugly duckling’ of the human rights - is  
more likely to continue to develop in importance than it is to become  
irrelevant, or indeed, to become destructive of our wellbeing.  
 
Having established that data privacy is neither a dead issue, nor 
necessarily harmful to society per se, I hasten to add that I 
acknowledge the inherent competition between data privacy on the one 
hand and other societal values on the other hand. While obviously 
vulnerable to the criticism of oversimplification, assertions such as the 
following highlight important questions:  
 
“At the heart of the issue is the question of tradeoffs: do we want  
more privacy in our data and, as a consequence, less efficiency  
and higher costs in the flow of data in commerce? Will we tolerate  
less security as a result of heightened restrictions on the access  
to our personal data that might be useful in combating crime or  
terrorism?26”  
Reasonable people may disagree on how these questions ought  
to be answered. However, two observations may be made. First,  
the answer is not to be found in a complete abandonment of data  
privacy protection, and second, the exact correlation between the  
level of data privacy protection afforded in a particular society  
and the level of security risk that society experiences is a topic  
that must be approached with great care and without undue  
generalisations.  
In the context of the public’s attitude to data privacy law, it is 
interesting to look at that right from Olivecrona’s perspective on 
rights.27 Discussing the meaning, or lack thereof, of the terms 
“rights” and “duties”, Olivecrona observed that:  
“The sentence that A is the owner of this piece of land 
functions as a permissive sign for himself with regard to this piece 
of land; at the same time it acts as a prohibitive sign for everybody 
else. The sentence is a green light for the owner, a red light for the 
others.28”  
Applying this to privacy, the sad truth seems to be that one person’s  
right of privacy far too seldom result in a red light for others. Indeed,  
as many people seem to struggle with what entitlements come with  
a right to privacy, the light that should have been green, may more  
 
26 Edward C Harris, ‘Personal Data Privacy Tradeoffs and How a Swedish Church Lady, Austrian Public 
Radio Employees, and Transatlantic Air Carriers Show That Europe Does Not Have the Answers’ (2006- 
2007) 22 American University International Law Review 746, 746.  
27 This discussion draws upon: Dan Svantesson, Fundamental policy considerations for the regulation of 
Internet cross-border privacy issues, Policy & Internet Vol. 3(3) 2011, Article 7 (2011).  
28 Karl Olivecrona, Legal Language and Reality, in Essays in Jurisprudence in Honor of Roscoe Pound. Ed. 
R. A. Newman, 151-91. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill. 1962, at 183. 
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often be amber, signalling the risks associated with an unchartered  
territory. Further, it seems that a large section of the public simply  
ignores the light altogether in their use of Facebook and other social  
media. Put in other, perhaps clearer, words, people in general either  
have a too vague idea of what entitlements stem from their right of  
privacy, or fail to appreciate the importance of privacy. At the same  
time, businesses and others, in whom we entrust our most personal  
information, do not feel significantly restrained in how they use  
and abuse our privacy. Taken together, this combination results in  
an inadequate privacy protection, and if we return to Olivecrona’s  
terminology, it could be said that we need clearer green lights and  
clearer red lights.  
 
Conceded that all this is correct, we must move on to ask how we can 
achieve a clearer understanding and stronger respect for the right of 
privacy. Olivercrona’s writings can aid us also in this regard. In 
discussing “performative utterances” such as promises made in a 
contractual situation, he notes that:  
 
“Their consequences are of a double nature. First, they have  
immediate, psychological effects. The promisor feels himself  
bound; the promise feels entitled to expect the promisor to  
act accordingly; contrary behavior is apt to provoke hostile  
reactions. Secondly, the acts correspond to certain requirements  
in the law; they are relevant in one way or another for actions  
by the state organs. Since the state organs regularly apply  
the rules, the promisor is likely to be exoposed to a sanction  
if he breaks his promise; his awareness of this fortifies the  
immediate psychological effect of the promise on him.29”  
Olivecrona also notes that: “The green and red lights do not express  
any notions. They are signs which have a social function because  
these two observations, the effect a right has is consequently based  
on the immediate psychological reaction it causes and the extent  
to which the law enforces, and is seen to enforce, the right. The  
solution would then seem to lie in changing the psychological  
reaction to privacy rights, and applying law more effectively and  
visibly. Unfortunately, that is not always the case.31  
 
 
29 Karl Olivecrona, Legal Language and Reality, in Essays in Jurisprudence in  
Honor of Roscoe Pound. Ed. R. A. Newman, 151-91. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill. 1962, at 180.  
30 Karl Olivecrona, Legal Language and Reality, in Essays in Jurisprudence in  
Honor of Roscoe Pound. Ed. R. A. Newman, 151-91. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill. 1962, at 183.  
31 For an interesting discussion of the importance of proper reporting, see: Greenleaf, GW., 2002, ‘Re- 
porting Privacy Complaints Pt 1: a proposal for systematic reporting of complaints in Asia-Pacific ju- 
risdictions’, in Privacy Law and Policy Reporter, vol 9(3), pp. 41 - 48; Greenleaf, GW., 2002, ‘Reporting  
Privacy Complaints Pt 2: complaint reporting practices of Asia-Pacific Privacy Commissioners’, in Privacy  
Law and Policy Reporter, vol 9(4), pp. 74 - 79; and Greenleaf, GW., 2002, ‘Reporting Privacy Complaints  
Pt 3: complaint reporting practices of Canadian Privacy Commissioners’, in Privacy Law and Policy Re- 
porter, vol 9(6), pp. 111 - 115. 
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WHAT DATA PRIVACY LAW AIMS TO ACHIEVE  
In his comprehensive study of data privacy law, Bygrave provides  
us with several important tools to better understand the core aims  
and functions of data privacy law. Here I will focus on the ‘central  
rules of data privacy law’ that his extensive international research  
has identified:  
 
The central rules of data privacy law embody a set of largely 
procedural principles. The core of these principles may be summed up as 
follows:  
 
a.- personal data should be collected by fair and lawful means  
 (principle of fair and lawful processing);  
b.- the amount of personal data collected should be limited to what  
 is necessary to achieve the purpose(s) for which the data is  
 gathered and further processed (principle of minimality);  
 c.- personal  data  should  be  collected  for  specified,  legitimate  
 purposes, and not used in ways that are incompatible with those  
 purposes (principle of purpose limitation);  
d.- personal data should be relevant, accurate, and complete in  
 relation to the purpose for which it is processed (principle of  
 data quality);  
e.- personal data should be protected against unauthorized attempts  
 to disclose, delete, change, or exploit it (principle of data  
security); [and]  
f.- processing of personal data should be transparent to, and capable  
 of being influenced by, the data subject (principle of data subject  
 influence).  
 
These are not the only principles found in data privacy law but they are 
central to it.32 (internal footnote omitted)  
 
In my view, if we allow ourselves to assume that the core principles  
do indeed carry out the aims of data privacy law, they give a clearer  
idea of what this area of law aims to achieve than does broad-brushed  
formal policy statements about the aim of this area of law, such as  
that found in Article 1 of Convention 10833 outlining its principal  
object “to secure in the territory of each Party for every individual,  
whatever his nationality or residence, respect for his rights and  
fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy, with  
regard to automatic processing of personal data relating to him  
(‘data protection’).”34  
 
32 Lee A. Bygrave, Data privacy law: An international perspective (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014), 
at 1-2.  
33 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, ETS 
No 108 (adopted on 28 January 1981).  
34 Lee A. Bygrave, Data privacy law: An international perspective (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014), 
at 119. 
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GEOGRAPHICAL   DIFFERENCES   IN   ATTITUDES   TO   DATA 
PRIVACY LAW  
 
Discussions of differences in attitude towards privacy typically focus on 
the transatlantic chasm between Europe on the one hand, and the US on 
the other hand. That discussion is of particular importance as it is 
often seen to represent the two alternatives between which the rest of 
the world needs to choose. Thus, I will here make a few observations 
about the transatlantic differences.  
 
However, first it is interesting to reflect on the available regulatory 
models in the data privacy arena. Moshell has identified four ‘basic 
models for regulation of data protection’. They are:  
a.- The comprehensive model - ‘The comprehensive model allows  
 for general laws governing collection, use, and distribution of  
 information in a system in which an oversight body monitors  
 both the private and public sectors to ensure compliance. [...] One  
 variation of the comprehensive model is the co-regulatory model,  
 in which industry takes an active role in both developing and  
 enforcing rules for the protection of data privacy.’35  
b.- The sectoral model - ‘The sectoral model involves no general laws;  
 rather it only targets those specific industries shown to be a threat  
 to data privacy.’36  
c.- The self-regulation model - ‘Companies and industry bodies establish  
 governance through codes and self-policing in the self-regulatory  
 model.’37  
d.- The  privacy  technologies  model  - ‘Not  so  much  a  model  
of  governance  as  a  tool  increasingly  used  by  governments, 
privacy technologies enable individual users to take a hand in the 
accumulation and distribution of their own personal data. 
Encryption, anonymous remailers, proxy servers, and digital cash are 
examples of advances that would enable a proficient Internet user to 
protect his or her own data privacy.’38  
 
As acknowledged by Moshell, none of these models are mutually 
exclusive ‘as  their  complimentary  or  contradictory  nature  is 
dependant upon their application’.39  
 
As to the transatlantic divide in attitudes towards data privacy,  
it has been noted that: ‘A face-off between EU and U.S. data- 
protection positions [...] present an interesting scenario in which  
 
35 Ryan Moshell, ‘...And Then There Was One: The Outlook for a Self-Regulatory United States amidst a  
Global Trend toward Comprehensive Data Protection’ (2004-2005) 37 Texas Tech Law Review 357, 366.  
36 Ibid 367.  
37 Ibid.  
38 Ibid (footnote omitted).  
39 Ibid 366. 
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the world’s largest consumer market and the world’s largest 
economy, respectively, occupy extreme opposite ends of the 
dataprotection spectrum’.40  
 
However, in the context of a trans-Atlantic comparison, it is interesting to 
start a bit further back in history, and it is important to bear in mind the role 
played by American scholars writing in the very earliest days of privacy. 
Already in 1890, Warren and Brandeis’ crucially important article ‘The 
right to privacy’ introduced a call for a privacy right in light of the 
technological development at the time:  
 
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to  
the next step which must be taken for the protection of  
the person, and for securing to the individual what Judge  
Cooley calls the right ‘to be let alone.’ Instantaneous  
photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the 
sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous 
mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that 
‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the 
house-tops.’41  
 
The enormous influence this article has had is unquestionable. In fact, 
in surveying the most-cited law review articles of all time, Shapiro 
and Pearse found that Warren and Brandeis’ mentioned article ranked 
second.42  
 
At least two conclusions should be drawn from this. First, 
privacy is neither a European invention, nor is it an exclusively 
European concern. Second, technological developments have been 
a driving force for the push for privacy since the very conception 
of the idea of a privacy right.  
 
Turning to privacy in the US today, several commentators are 
critical. For example, Moshell concludes:  
 
Taken as a whole, the U.S. system of self-regulation of data  
protection has proved to be fundamentally flawed. Without  
legislation that provides a solid support structure for what  
little  government  data-protection  authority  exists,  the  
United States suffers from a general lack of enforcement  
that  stems  from  industry  disregard  for  voluntary  data- 
protection concepts. Not only does this deficiency handicap  
the United States’ effort to uphold what many consider  
 
 
40 Ibid 359.  
41 Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review 193, 195 
(footnotes omitted).  
42 Fred R Shapiro and Michelle Pearse, ‘The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time’ (2011-2012) 110 
Michigan Law Review 1483, 1489. 
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to be a fundamental right, but because of the economic 
consequences, it also conceivably risks the United States’ 
supremacy in a globalized economy.43  
Greenleaf’s assessment is that:  
The USA is best seen as a country with a unique, largely isolated,  
and sometimes inconsistent approach to data privacy, with some key  
standards weaker than is common in the rest of the world (particularly  
limits on collection, secondary use, disclosure, and data exports [ie the  
heartlands of European data privacy law]). But it also often provides  
international innovation in relation to some principles (eg data breach  
disclosure, and other aspects of security) and in the deterrent effect of  
draconian examples of enforcement, particularly by the FTC.44  
In short, as noted by Cate: ‘The protection for information privacy in the 
U.S. is far removed from that provided by the EU’s data protection 
directive.’45  
In 1970, Hesse - a federal state of Germany - passed the world’s  
first data privacy Act. This was followed by the first such law on a  
national level being introduced in Sweden in 1973.46 The European  
preoccupation with the right of data privacy, or data protection,  
stems at least in part from the horrendous experiences in Europe  
during the Second World War during which records of personal data  
were used for the purpose of identifying Jewish individuals.47  
However, there is certainly also a commercial side to data privacy, and  
the European attitude to data privacy may be seen as an attempt to create  
a competitive advantage in an increasingly cutthroat world economy.  
As expressed by the Vice-President of the European Commission  
Viviane Reding: ‘The new rules also give EU companies an advantage  
in global competition. [...] Trust in a coherent EU regulatory regime  
 
 
43 Ryan Moshell, ‘...And Then There Was One: The Outlook for a Self-Regulatory United States amidst a 
Global Trend toward Comprehensive Data Protection’ (2004-2005) 37 Texas Tech Law Review 357, 384 
(footnotes omitted).  
44 Graham Greenleaf, ‘The Influence of European Data Privacy Standards outside Europe: Implications for 
Globalization of Convention 108’ (2012) 2(2) International Data Privacy Law 68, 72. See also Graham 
Greenleaf and Nigel Waters, ‘Obama’s Privacy Framework: An Offer to Be Left on the Table?’ (2012) 119 
Privacy Laws and Business International Report 6-9.  
45 Fred H Cate, ‘The European Data Protection Directive and European-US Trade’ (1998) 7 Currents:  
International Trade Law Journal 61, 73. While now slightly dated, this article provides an interesting  
comparison between US and EU data privacy law. See also, eg: Steven R Salbu, ‘The European Union  
Data Privacy Directive and International Relations’ (2002) 35 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law  
655. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the  
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of  
Such Data 1995 OJ (L 281) 31.  
46 Datalag (Sweden) 1973:289.  
47 Data Protection Commissioner, Section 1: What is Privacy? (14 November 2007 ) <http://www.  
dataprotection.ie/documents/  teens/cspe%20resource%20booklet/Section_2_-_Privacy_as_a_Human_  
Right.pdf>. 
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will be a key asset for service providers and an incentive for investors 
looking for optimal conditions when locating services.’48  
 
While frequently emulated, the European approach to data privacy  
has also been subject to extensive criticism. For example, one  
commentator concludes that the EU approach places too much  
emphasis on privacy and thus has failed to strike an appropriate  
balance between privacy and the competing interests including the  
interests of free data flows and of security.49 Further, the same author  
has argued that ECJ cases have shown that ‘the rights extended to  
E.U. citizens by the [Data Protection] Directive fail to recognize the  
practical realities of how data is used in global commerce’.50  
Discussing the Directive, Kuner notes that:  
The lack of widespread and consistent enforcement of data  
protection violations has a negative affect on the willingness  
of data controllers to comply with European data protection  
rules. [...] In the globalized economy, all factors affecting cost  
(including legal compliance burdens) tend to be subject to a  
risk management exercise, with compliance being more likely  
when the risks and costs of non-compliance are higher than  
those of compliance. Thus, in many cases data controllers  
may regard data protection rules as a kind of bureaucratic  
nuisance rather than as ‘law’ in the same category as tax and other 
laws, mainly because of the relative lack of enforcement and the 
relative mildness of the possible penalties.51  
Importantly, he has also pointed out that:  
“Data protection law is a European success story that was  
ahead of its time and has since spread around the world. But  
the EU Data Protection Directive was enacted just before the  
Internet revolution and the globalization of data processing  
got underway, and thus requires rethinking and adjustment  
to retain its internal cohesion, and thus its effectiveness, for  
authorities, data controllers, and individuals alike.52”  
 
48 Viviane Reding, ‘The European Data Protection Framework for the Twenty-First Century’ (2012) 2(3) 
International Data Privacy Law 119, 129. Importantly, Reding’s assertion as to the competitive advantages 
to be gained from a well-structured data privacy framework has also been recognised by industry. See, eg: 
Peter Cullen and Jean Gonié, ‘1995 - 2012: from a Directive to a Regulation, the Microsoft Perspective’ 
(2012) 2(3) International Data Privacy Law 117, 117.  
49 Edward C Harris, ‘Personal Data Privacy Tradeoffs and How a Swedish Church Lady, Austrian Public 
Radio Employees, and Transatlantic Air Carriers Show That Europe Does Not Have the Answers’ (2006- 
2007) 22 American University International Law Review 746.  
50 Ibid 798.  
51 Christopher, The ‘Internal Morality’ of European Data Protection Law (November 24, 2008). Available  
at SSRN: http://ssrn. com/abstract=1443797 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1443797, at 9.  
52 Christopher, The ‘Internal Morality’ of European Data Protection Law (November 24, 2008). Avail- 
able at SSRN: http://ssrn. com/abstract=1443797 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1443797, at 19. 
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It will be interesting to see the extent to which the ongoing reform to 
the EU data protection framework will be better placed to deal with 
modern communications technologies.  
 
In any case, the European attachment to data privacy is perhaps best  
illustrated by reference to the fact that ‘the EU Charter on Human  
Rights adopted in 2000 by the Treaty of Nice has distinguished  
the Data Protection from the Privacy Right in order to consecrate  
the right of each EU citizen to have all his or her personal data  
protected[.]’53  
 
More precisely, Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union54 addresses the protection of personal data and reads as 
follows:  
 
a.- Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data  
 concerning him or her.  
b.- Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on  
 the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other  
 legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of  
 access to data which has been collected concerning him or her,  
 and the right to have it rectified.  
c.- Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an  
 independent authority.  
This is complimented by the, in a sense more typical, Article 7 
addressing the right of respect for private and family life: ‘Everyone has 
the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and 
communications.’  
 
Background facts such as what has been presented above must  
be borne in mind when one approaches the modern treatment  
of data privacy. At the same time, it is encouraging to see what  
may be viewed as indications of a forthcoming convergence and  
harmonisation between the rather distinct approaches taken by the  
EU and the US.55  
THE UNIQUE ON LINE ENVIRONMENT  
The fact that the widespread uptake of information and communication  
technologies (ICT) has revolutionised the handling of personal  
information is beyond intelligent dispute. Indeed, countless journal  
articles and conference papers commence by pointing to this fact.  
 
 
53 Yves Poullet, ‘Transborder Data Flows and Extraterritoriality: The European Position ’ (2007) 2(3) 
Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 141, 143 (footnote omitted).  
54 (2000/C 364/01). The Charter only came into force 1 December 2009.  
55 See further: Christopher Kuner et al, ‘Moving Forward Together’ (2012) 2(3) International Data Privacy 
Law 81. 
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Yet, there is currently a paucity of in-depth analysis of exactly how  
ICT has impacted upon the handling of personal information. A  
related and perhaps even more fundamental question, deserving of  
further attention, is the matter of what it is that makes the online  
environment different for the purpose of the handling of personal  
information. This part is devoted to that very question.  
I have identified seven particularly important characteristics of ICT that 
individually, and in conjunction, cause significant changes to the 
handling of personal information. They are discussed in some detail 
below and include:  
a.- Large data collections;  
b.- Interconnectivity between networks;  
c.- The border-disregarding nature;  
d.- The ease of data distribution;  
e.- The difficulty of data deletion;  
f.- The ease of data searches; and  
g.- The security difficulties.  
I  obviously  acknowledge  the  subjectivity  of  this  exercise  
and  the  impossibility  of  identifying  and  classifying  all  such  
characteristics. I have selected those characteristics I feel are of  
the greatest importance. Others may have opted to emphasise other  
characteristics. However, I think it is unlikely that anyone would  
disagree that the characteristics I have identified are of importance.  
Large data collections  
ICT makes possible the collection, storage, use and distribution of data on a 
previously unimaginable scale. And with increasing storage and 
processing power in ever smaller devices, combined with increased 
connection speeds, it can be anticipated that data collection, storage, use 
and distribution will only continue to increase.  
Lately, ‘Big data’ has become a term of art referring to ‘novel ways in 
which organizations, including government and businesses, combine 
diverse digital datasets and then use statistics and other data mining 
techniques to extract from them both hidden information and surprising 
correlations’.56  
Just how large quantities of data we are dealing with is clear from the 
below:  
“The Economist reports in its 2012 Outlook that the quantity  
of global digital data expanded from 130 exabytes in 2005 to  
1,227 in 2010, and is predicted to rise to 7,910 exabytes in 2015.  
 
56 Ira S Rubinstein, ‘Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning?’ (2013) 3 (2) International Data 
Privacy Law 74, 74. 
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[‘Welcome to the yotta world’, The Outlook for 2012, Economist,  
Dec. 2011; http://www.economist.com/node/2 1537922.]  
An exabyte is a quintillion bytes. If you find that hard to 
visualize, consider this: someone has calculated that if you 
loaded an exabyte of data on to DVDs in slimline jewel cases, and 
then loaded them into Boeing 747 aircraft, it would take 13,513 
planes to transport one exabyte of data. Using DVDs to move the 
data collected globally in 2010 would require a fleet of more than 
16 million jumbo jets.57”  
Where large quantities of data are being stored, such collections  
may, depending on the type of data, become ‘honey pots’ targeted  
by parties wanting to gain access to the data in question. Typical  
examples of honey pots include databases that include credit card  
information, user details, passwords etc. In other words, size is a  
problem in itself when it comes to data management, and perhaps it  
could be said that the larger the data collection the more attractive it  
is to third parties and, therefore, the more at risk it is.  
Interconnectivity between networks  
One of the greatest characteristics of the Internet is its ability to 
connect people. This comes naturally as the Internet is a ‘network of 
networks’ - a vast number of smaller networks connected together to 
make a very large network. It is, for example, due to the fact that Bond 
University’s network is connected to the rest of the Internet that one can 
access the Bond University library catalogue from eg London, Las 
Vegas or Lima.  
From a data protection perspective, this interconnectivity is clearly 
associated with risks. This is so not least due to the fact that typically as 
soon as a network is connected to the Internet, it can be accessed remotely 
and thereby it becomes vulnerable to access by parties that should not get 
access to the network.  
The border-disregarding nature  
 
The Internet was not designed with geopolitical borders in mind. At the 
same time, geography is by no means unimportant in the online context. 
In fact, geographical considerations are often as prevalent online as they 
are offline.  
In light of this, it is unsurprising that Internet technology has 
developed so as to make possible the identification of the geographical 
location of Internet users (‘geo-identification’) through the use of 
so-called ‘geo-location technologies’.  
 
57 Christopher Kuner et al, ‘Editorial: The Challenge of “Big Data” for Data Protection’ (2012) 2 (2) 
International Data Privacy Law 47-49. 
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The existence of such technologies fundamentally challenges some key 
conceptions of the Internet and Internet regulation. In fact, geolocation 
technologies may play a central role in future schemes for dealing with 
cross-border Internet issues.  
The ease of data distribution  
It has been said that in the mid-1980s, Stewart Brand made the  
interesting observation that ‘information wants to be free’.58 While  
this statement may be associated with a degree of controversy, the  
ease with which information can be distributed is undeniable.  
This ease of distribution significantly impacts data privacy; after all, 
data privacy is, in a sense, about restricting or controlling the movement 
of data.  
The difficulty of data deletion  
In 2007, Google launched its Google Street View (‘Street View’)  
system. Street View allows users to view panoramic images on a  
street level. The images for Street View were collected by driving  
cars equipped with a set of cameras along public roads taking photos  
that could be assembled to a seamless view of the streets.  
 
As could be expected, images of people doing all sorts of things 
people  do  on  public  streets  were  captured.  One  particularly 
unfortunate image showed a woman stepping in or out of a car with 
the result that a substantial part of her bottom being visible in the image. 
When this was discovered, the image was removed by Google. 
However, prior to being deleted, the image had been copied and can be 
found online to this day.  
 
While perhaps a rather mundane occurrence, this series of events shows 
us something important - once content is placed online, it may be 
difficult, or indeed impossible, to get it removed. This is of course 
closely related to the characteristic ease with which data is distributed 
discussed above, but it is also a characteristic that is deserving of 
attention in its own right.  
 
For the woman in question to ensure that the image is removed  
permanently and completely from the Internet, she would need  
to identify all sources from which the image in question can be  
accessed. She would then need to contact all those sources and get  
their agreement to have the image removed. This is complicated by  
the omnipresent nature of the Internet which means that the sources  
may be geographically spread. It is also complicated by the fact that  
 
 
58 Information Wants to Be Free (7 May 2013) Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_  
wants_to_be_free>. 
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Internet content such as web pages and the images they hold are 
frequently backed up (‘cached’) eg by search engines.  
In conclusion, there can be no doubt that the difficulty of deleting data 
significantly impacts data privacy.  
The ease of data searches  
Unstructured data is largely inaccessible data until it is searchable.  
The Internet is made up of both structured and unstructured data in  
a sense. However, as a whole the Internet is best viewed as being  
unstructured.  
 
The widespread availability of relatively accurate search engines 
means that the unstructured data that makes up the Internet becomes 
accessible in a manner it would otherwise not be. And with this 
accessibility comes increased data protection risks.  
 
The important role played by search engines came under the 
proverbial microscope in a recent decision by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU).59 The decision is highly relevant and worth 
considering in some detail.60  
When Spanish citizen Mr Mario Costeja González, via a Google  
search, found links to two, for him unflattering, pages of the  
Spanish newspaper La Vanguardia from 1998, he requested that the  
newspaper remove the personal information about him contained in  
the relevant pages. He also requested that Google Spain and Google  
Inc remove or conceal the personal data relating to him so that the  
data no longer appeared in the search results and in the links to La  
Vanguardia.  
The matter ended up before the Spanish data protection authority 
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD). The AEPD 
rejected the complaint against La Vanguardia. At the same time, it 
upheld the complaint against Google.  
Google brought the matter before the Spanish National High Court  
(Audiencia Nacional), and that court referred the matter to the  
CJEU.  
As could be expected, the CJEU’s decision is legally technical  
and many of the legal questions dealt with are specific to the  
 
 
59 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González (Case 
C-131/12)  
60 This part draws upon: Dan Svantesson, Google court ruling creates a more forgetful internet, The  
Conversation (14 May 2014) (https://theconversation.com/google-court-ruling-creates-a-more-forget- 
ful-internet-26696). 
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European Union. However, the consequences of the decision are 
global. For example, the Court discussed in detail whether the 
functions carried out by Google Search amounted to data 
“processing”, and whether Google was a data “controller” under the 
relevant EU law.  
 
The Court answering both these questions in the affirmative meant that 
Google was responsible for its search results completely 
independently of the possible liabilities of the publishers, such as the 
newspaper in this case.  
 
This means that even if certain content, such as the newspaper 
reporting relating to Mr Mario Costeja González, can lawfully be 
uploaded to the Internet, it may be unlawful for Google to list such 
content in its search results.  
For the EU, there are practical advantages in such an approach. It  
means that, by controlling the search engines, it can affect at least the  
likelihood of personal information being found online even where  
the information is provided by a party located outside the EU:  
“Given the ease with which information published on a website can  
be replicated on other sites and the fact that the persons responsible  
for its publication are not always subject to European Union  
legislation, effective and complete protection of data users could  
not be achieved if the latter had to obtain first or in parallel the  
erasure of the information relating to them from the publishers of  
websites.61”  
Perhaps the most serious aspect of the judgment relate to the so- 
called “right to be forgotten”. The Court concluded that, where search  
results appear to be inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or  
excessive, the information and links concerned in the list of results  
must be erased. This applies even where the information is true and  
published lawfully by third parties. In other words, the Court places  
on Google the burden of deciding whether search results have  
become outdated.  
The practical difficulties with this are obvious. First of all, there is  
the risk of search engines erring on the side of caution and removing  
any content complained of. After all, the risks of not removing the  
content may easily outweigh any perceived advantage of keeping  
the content accessible. Second, content may be seen to be outdated  
and irrelevant on one date only to become highly relevant again at  
a later date.  
 
 
 
61 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González (Case 
C-131/12). 
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For example, information about a person’s conduct may be seen to  
be outdated one day but become relevant again at a later date if that  
conduct is repeated. In other words, the relevance of information  
is not static - it is constantly changing and is always dependent on  
context.  
In any case, the Court’s conclusion on the right to be forgotten will no 
doubt reverberate across the world. Indeed, it forces the creation of a more 
forgetful internet.  
From a privacy perspective this must be seen as a victory. But at  
the same time, privacy interests must always be balanced against  
competing interest such as freedom of information. The Court  
acknowledged this and stated that, while the right to be forgotten  
ordinarily trumps competing interests such as the economic interest  
of the search engine operator and the interest of the general public in  
finding information upon a search relating to the data subject’s name:  
“That would not be the case if it appeared, for particular reasons, such  
as the role played by the data subject in public life, that the interference  
with his fundamental rights is justified by the preponderant interest  
of the general public in having, on account of inclusion in the list of  
results, access to the information in question.”62  
The question is of course how this assessment will work in practice.  
The security difficulties  
Time and time again we see evidence of the difficulty, some say  
impossibility, of keeping data secure. There have been several  
spectacular ICT security failures in just the recent years. For  
example, in 2011 SONY revealed that the personal information  
of approximately 75 million Play Station Network users had been  
compromised as a result of an illegal intrusion on its system. The  
aftermath of this intrusion is still on-going at the time of writing,  
with SONY dropping its appeal against a £250,000 fine issued by the  
UK Information Commissioner’s Office as late as 13 July 2013.63  
There is, unfortunately, a wealth of other examples of hacking 
incidences with major impact, and the only thing that is certain is that 
there is no end to such incidents in sight.  
 
In 2014, the Australian Defence Signal Directorate brought attention  
to the following four trends that in combination will enhance the  
incentives for, and capability to conduct, malicious activity in  
cyberspace:  
 
62 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González (Case 
C-131/12), at para 84.  
63 Mike Suszek, Sony Drops Appeal for ICO-Issued 2011 Data Loss Fine (13 July 2013) Joystick <http://  
www.joystiq. com/2013/07/13/sony-drops-appeal-for-ico-issued-2011-data-loss-fine/>. 
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Motivation is increasing. Australia’s increasing reliance on the 
Internet is leading to more high-value information being stored and 
communicated on Australian government and commercial networks. 
This is boosting the incentive to undertake cyber crime or exploitation 
for direct monetary profit or indirect economic and political 
advantage.  
 
Capability is easier to acquire. Acquiring a cyber capability is  
becoming  easier  with  increasingly  sophisticated  tools, 
information, and guidance readily available online.  
New technologies will generate new vulnerabilities. The  
proliferation of new technologies will increase the number of  
potential vulnerabilities. Of note, the growth in cloud computing  
and  expanding  use  of  mobile  computing  devices,  such  as  
smartphones, laptops and tablet computers, will generate more  
platforms—with distinct software, settings and applications—  
and more users to exploit.  
The spectrum of malicious actors is expanding. The ease of 
acquiring a cyber capability coupled with the potential high 
gains—whether financial, economic, diplomatic or political—is 
enticing more actors into malicious cyber activity.64  
 
Thus, personal information will continue to be at risk due to security 
difficulties.  
CONCLUDING  REMARKS  -  A  PARADIGM  SHIFT  IN  DATA 
PRIVACY LAW?  
The terms ‘paradigm’ and ‘paradigm shift’ have gained such a 
degree of popularity that they arguably have crossed the border 
separating meaningful terms from the land of meaningless clichés. 
Perhaps this overuse is sparked by an overemphasis, at least in the 
academic world, on works resulting in paradigm shifts - such works are 
frequently seen as the hallmark of great scholarship. However, one may 
wonder whether such an overemphasis may be disruptive and thereby 
harmful to academic work.  
In any case, and at the risk of playing a part in what may be harmful 
behaviour, I suggest that there may be reasons to consider whether we 
are reaching a need for a paradigm shift in data privacy law resulting, 
in no small part, from the special characteristics of the Internet 
environment.  
Without engaging with the highly interesting literature on the  
topic, it could perhaps be said that we are in a largely consent- 
 
64 Australian Defence Signals Directorate http://www.asd.gov.au/publications/Information_Security_  
Manual_2014_Exec_ Companion.pdf, at 5. 
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based paradigm of informational self-determination. And the most 
interesting question is what type of paradigm we then are, and ought 
to be, moving towards. One possibility is that we are moving towards a 
paradigm of what in derogatory terms could be referred to as ‘nanny 
state data protection’.  
Despite the negative term, such an alternative may not be all bad, and  
inspiration could be drawn from the, now superseded, EU Council  
Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts came into force on  
the 11th of May 1993.65 Put simply, the structure of this Directive  
includes a set of broadly worded principles66 that are backed up by  
a list of specific examples of conduct67 that would typically violate  
those principles.  
The approach taken in that Directive could be seen as a step away from 
party autonomy and self-determination in that it, whatever may be the 
genuine wishes of the parties, prevents certain types of contract terms 
from being included in certain types of contracts under certain 
conditions.  
One can easily picture a similar ‘nanny state’ approach in data privacy  
law, which would mark a departure from a largely consent-based  
paradigm of informational self-determination. The advantages are  
obvious. For example, if the rules in question are carefully drafted,  
they may provide a clearer guidance for businesses and other  
organisations handling personal data. Further, and most importantly,  
we would no longer need to rely on the fairy-tale like notion of  
‘genuine consent’68- a notion that even if we all can describe it, we  
all know does not exist in reality.  
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